Journal article

Joint desirability foundations of social choice and opinion pooling

  • Casanova, Arianna Istituto Dalle Molle di studi sull'intelligenza artificiale (IDSIA), Facoltà di scienze informatiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
  • Miranda, Enrique University of Oviedo, Oviedo, Spain
  • Zaffalon, Marco Istituto Dalle Molle di studi sull'intelligenza artificiale (IDSIA), Facoltà di scienze informatiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
    19.04.2021
Published in:
  • Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence. - Springer. - 2021, no. 89, p. 965–1011
English We develop joint foundations for the fields of social choice and opinion pooling using coherent sets of desirable gambles, a general uncertainty model that allows to encompass both complete and incomplete preferences. This leads on the one hand to a new perspective of traditional results of social choice (in particular Arrow’s theorem as well as sufficient conditions for the existence of an oligarchy and democracy) and on the other hand to using the same framework to analyse opinion pooling. In particular, we argue that weak Pareto (unanimity) should be given the status of a rationality requirement and use this to discuss the aggregation of experts’ opinions based on probability and (state-independent) utility, showing some inherent limitation of this framework, with implications for statistics. The connection between our results and earlier work in the literature is also discussed.
Language
  • English
Classification
Demography, sociology, statistics
License
License undefined
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://susi.usi.ch/usi/documents/319326
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