Preprint

Physician dispensing and antibiotic prescriptions

  • Filippini, Massimo Istituto microeconomia e economia pubblica (MecoP), Facoltà di scienze economiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
  • Masiero, Giuliano Istituto microeconomia e economia pubblica (MecoP), Facoltà di scienze economiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
  • Moschetti, Karine Department of Economics and Technology Management, University of Bergamo, Italy
    2009

25 p.

English The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappropriate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead to inefficiencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic areas in Switzerland. We find evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
License
License undefined
Identifiers
  • RERO DOC 13030
  • ARK ark:/12658/srd1318309
Persistent URL
https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1318309
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