Physician dispensing and antibiotic prescriptions
      
      
        
      
      
      
      
        
          
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Filippini, Massimo
  Istituto microeconomia e economia pubblica (MecoP), Facoltà di scienze economiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
          
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Masiero, Giuliano
  Istituto microeconomia e economia pubblica (MecoP), Facoltà di scienze economiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
          
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Moschetti, Karine
  Department of Economics and Technology Management, University of Bergamo, Italy
          
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
        25 p.
        
        
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
       
      
      
      
        
        English
        
        
        
          The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappropriate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead to inefficiencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic areas in Switzerland. We find evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.
        
        
       
      
      
      
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
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                  Economics
                
              
            
          
        
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          Open access status
        
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          green
        
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  RERO DOC
  
    
      13030
    
  
            
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  ARK
  
    
      ark:/12658/srd1318309
    
  
            
 
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          Persistent URL
        
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          https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1318309
        
 
   
  
  
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