Physician dispensing and antibiotic prescriptions
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Filippini, Massimo
Istituto microeconomia e economia pubblica (MecoP), Facoltà di scienze economiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
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Masiero, Giuliano
Istituto microeconomia e economia pubblica (MecoP), Facoltà di scienze economiche, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera
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Moschetti, Karine
Department of Economics and Technology Management, University of Bergamo, Italy
25 p.
English
The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappropriate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead to inefficiencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic areas in Switzerland. We find evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.
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Language
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Classification
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Economics
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License
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License undefined
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Identifiers
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RERO DOC
13030
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ARK
ark:/12658/srd1318309
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Persistent URL
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https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1318309
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