Journal article

The ecology of risk taking

    2003
Published in:
  • Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. - 2004, vol. 28, no. 195-228
English We analyze the risk level chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality. We show that even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their reputation in the market, and that such choices will be influenced by the mix of other agents’ types. Assuming that the market has no strong prior about whether the agents are good or bad, good agents will choose low levels of risk, and bad agents high levels. Empirical evidence is gathered on 2462 firms over 24 years. The results support the model: agents of higher quality have less variable performance.
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
Other electronic version

Versione pubblicata

License
License undefined
Identifiers
  • RERO DOC 5447
Persistent URL
https://susi.usi.ch/usi/documents/317945
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