Bova, Antonio 2009 This paper focuses on Wittgenstein's notion of psychological concepts. According to the Austrian philosopher, it is only the Grammar to provide the means in order to properly interpret the psychological concepts, and the description of internals mental states is reduced to the description of the use of words. Psychological facts and phenomena are thus replaced with the notion of psychological concepts, which would exist only through linguistic expressions. The language is not conceived as a static image of logical rules far from the real contexts of interaction, but rather as a living entity which constantly transforms itself through its usage. Consequently, the meaning of a psychological concept, like any other linguistic expression, is strictly bounded to its ordinary usage. application/pdf https://localhost:5000/ark:/12658/srd1318380 https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/318380 https://susi.usi.ch/documents/318380/files/Bova_LW_2009.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1318380 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Language and World : proceedings of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium. - Frankfurt am Main : Ontos. - 2009, p. 64-65 Psychological concepts ordinary language context, internal mental states info:eu-repo/classification/udc/65 Interpretation of psychological concepts in Wittgenstein http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794