Franzoni, Francesco 2008 Mandatory contributions to defined benefit pension plans provide a unique identification strategy to estimate the market's assessment of the value of internal resources controlling for investment opportunities. The price decrease following a pension-induced drop in cash is magnified for firms that appear a priori more financially constrained, suggesting a negative effect of financing frictions on investment. In contrast, low control on managerial discretion attenuates the negative price reaction to contributions consistent with empire-building theories. While overinvestment seems to be the prevalent distortion in a panel of large firms, underinvestment appears to dominate in a sample that is more representative of the cross-section of listed companies. application/pdf https://localhost:5000/ark:/12658/srd1318318 https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/318318 https://susi.usi.ch/documents/318318/files/Franzoni_JFE_2009.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.06.004 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1318318 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Journal of financial economics. - Elsevier. - 2009, vol. 92, no. 3, p. 491-518 Financial constraints corporate governance underinvestment overinvestment info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Underinvestment vs. overinvestment : evidence from price reactions to pension contributions http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501