Filippini, Massimo Masiero, Giuliano Moschetti, Karine 2009 The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappropriate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead to inefficiencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic areas in Switzerland. We find evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse. application/pdf https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/318309 https://localhost:5000/ark:/12658/srd1318309 https://susi.usi.ch/documents/318309/files/wp0908.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1318309 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Physician dispensing antibiotic use info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Physician dispensing and antibiotic prescriptions http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_816b