Levaggi, Rosella Menoncin, Francesco 2007-10-17 In some countries the reform of public health care provision has been accompanied by a parallel process of devolution that has also entailed the organisation of health care becoming a regional competence. However, the application of fiscal federalism in the context of the provision of health care is not so straightforward due to the nature of the services involved. In this paper we will concentrate on the related phenomenon of the soft budget constraint phenomenon. This framework can be traced back to that of a game where less efficient local authorities prefer to send their citizens to receive services outside their region instead of becoming more efficient. In order to improve the probability of being bailed out, the users are sent to other local authorities where there is excess capacity. The lack of coordination between local objectives and total welfare means that this policy is optimal at local level, but inefficient at Central Government level. application/pdf https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1318235 https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/318235 https://susi.usi.ch/documents/318235/files/wp0703.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1318235 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Soft budget constraint Health care provision Patients mobility info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Fiscal federalism, patient mobility and the soft budget constraint : a theoretical approach http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_816b