Filippini, M. Masiero, G. Moschetti, K. 2008 The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappropriate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead to ine¢ ciencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic areas in Switzerland. We find evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse. application/pdf https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1318188 https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/318188 https://susi.usi.ch/documents/318188/files/wp0808.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1318188 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Dispensing Antibiotic use info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Dispensing practices and antibiotic use http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_816b