Degeorge, François Jenter, Dirk Moel, Alberto Tufano, Peter 2003-03-01 In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees' decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with our neoclassical model. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees' investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure this "threshold effect"; (3) employees “left on the table” one to two months’ salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset. application/pdf https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/317923 https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1317923 https://susi.usi.ch/documents/317923/files/1_Degeo_jfe_032003.pdf https://susi.usi.ch/documents/317923/files/2_Degeo_jfe_2003_App_B_and_C.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00184-3 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1317923 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Journal of Financial Economics. - 2004, vol. 71, no. 169-210 Privatization Employee ownership Portfolio choice info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Selling company shares to reluctant employees : France telecom's experience http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501