<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Nowak, Eric</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2004</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">This chapter explores the stock price impact of expirations of lock-up provisions that prevent insiders from selling their shares after the Initial Public Offering (IPO). We examine 172 lock-up expirations of 142 IPOs floated on Germany’s Neuer Markt. We detect significant negative abnormal returns and a 25% increase in trading volume surrounding lock-up expiration. The negative abnormal returns are larger for firms with high volatility; superior performance after the IPO, low free float, and venture capital financed firms. The negative price reaction is significantly stronger for the expiration of voluntary lock-up agreements than for mandatory prohibitions of disposal.</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://susi.usi.ch/global/documents/317901</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://n2t.net/ark:/12658/srd1317901</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://susi.usi.ch/documents/317901/files/nowak_AFE_2004.pdf</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/12658/srd1317901</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>License undefined</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>Advances in Financial Economics / Hirschey, Mark ; John, Kose ; Makhija, Anil K.. - Bingley : Emerald. - 2004, vol. 10, p. 181- 200</dc:source>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Initial public offerings</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns2="xml" ns2:lang="en">lock-up agreements</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns3="xml" ns3:lang="en">The expiration of mandatory and voluntary IPO Lock-up provisions : empirical evidence from Germany’s Neuer Markt</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>
